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A NEW AGE OF PRO-EMPLOYER RIGHTS:
ARE AUTOMATIC ASSIGNMENTS THE STANDARD?
Shannon H. Hedvat*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Knowledge and innovation have increasingly become the drivers
behind the (private) economic sector, particularly through intangible assets
created from ―intellectual capital.‖1 A company‘s market value is now
greatly dependent upon the company‘s intangible assets rather than its
tangible assets.2
The rising significance of ―intellectual capital,‖
particularly patents, requires companies to carefully consider how to
categorize the ownership of employees‘ innovations developed while under
employment. The Federal Circuit‘s 2008 decision in DDB Technologies,
LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP, holding that federal law, not state law,
governs the interpretation of patent assignments in employment
agreements,3 creates several concerns for many current and potential
companies, employers, and employees. The effects on innovation, research
and development, hiring patterns, and other corporate decisions in several
industries may be more substantial than the Federal Circuit anticipated.
Consequently, an analysis of the effects of the DDB Technologies
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1. James E. Malackowski et al., Innovation Measurement: The Economic Impact of
Patent
Value
1
(2007)
http://www.innovationmetrics.gov/comments/051107OceanTomo.pdf. ―Intellectual capital‖
is categorized as ―a company‘s intangible assets, including those assets traditionally referred
to as intellectual property—patents, trademarks and copyrights.‖ Id.
2. Id. ―[I]ntangible value as a percentage of market value has grown from 16.8% in
1975, to 32.4% in 1985, to 68.4% in 1995, and to 79.7% in 2005.‖ Id. Over 30 years,
therefore, the percentage of market value increased almost five times its value since 1975.
3. DDB Technologies, LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP, 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
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decision is necessary, especially as it was a case of ―first impression.‖4
This examination begins with an overview of the history behind the
relationship between employee innovations and employers. In particular,
Part II of this Comment explores the evolution from a ―pro-employee‖ and
―individual genius‖ approach to one favoring employers with respect to
innovation ownership and rights. Part III of this Comment then examines
the facts and reasoning underlying the Federal Circuit‘s groundbreaking
decision in DDB Technologies. Part IV subsequently investigates the
significance of employee innovations for both firms and inventors from an
economic, financial, equitable, and contractual perspective. Finally, this
Comment concludes with a projection and analysis into how the DDB
Technologies decision may affect the employer-employee relationship and
how it may drastically change the method through which each party arrives
at its decisions in launching a new employment relationship.
II.

HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMPLOYEE INNOVATION
AND EMPLOYERS

The United States Constitution grants Congress the power ―to promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries.‖5 Patent law has recognized this idea of protected invention as
a product of ―individual genius.‖6 The history of employers‘ rights to an
employee‘s ―individual genius‖ can be divided into three stages. First,
from 1840 to the mid-1880s, an inventor‘s employment status was
irrelevant in determining patent ownership.7 After the 1880s, however,
courts began to recognize the ―shop right rule,‖8 although they infrequently
awarded it despite employers‘ emphasis on hiring particular individuals
solely to invent.9 Finally, the third stage of the development of the current
4. Mike Baniak & Todd Dawson, Discussion of Employer Assignment Agreements
after DDB Technologies v. MLB Advanced Media, 7 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 298, 307
(2009).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6. Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of Genius’: Law
and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1139 (1998).
7. Id. at 1132-33.
8. The ―shop right rule‖ grants an employer the right to practice a given employee‘s
invention when the idea was conceived and perfected during the hours of employment and
with the employer‘s resources. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178,
196 (1933) (citing Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890); McClurg v. Kingsland,
42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843)). For a discussion on the difference between an ―implied
license‖ and ―shop rights,‖ see ROBERT PATRICK MERGERS & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY,
PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1198 (4th ed. 2007) and Annotation,
Right to Inventions as Between Employer and Employee, 153 A.L.R. 983 (1944).
9. Fisk, supra note 6, at 1132-33.
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legal doctrine, covering employers‘ rights to employees‘ innovations, was
greatly influenced by the emergence and prevalence of contracts in the
1900s.10 This period represented a trend toward an invention ownership
approach that has been adopted by courts and companies today,
demonstrating the evolution from the focus on the ―individual genius‖ to
one on corporate decision-making.11
A.

Individual Genius as a Determinant of Patent Ownership

Traditionally, individual efforts, not those related to an ―employersponsored research agenda,‖ produced the most inventions.12 Courts
initially demonstrated a strong opposition to employment contracts
granting rights to employers for employees‘ innovations.13 This approach
was consistent with the labor theory developed by John Locke.14 Locke‘s
principle maintains that inventors have a natural right to their inventions
(―property‖) because such innovations are results of their labor and
efforts.15 Nonetheless, courts implemented and widely applied different
strategies during earlier periods, when holding that a contract did not assign
patent rights to employers.

10. Id. In the early 1900s, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized ―[t]he
general right [of an employer] to make a contract in relation to his business [a]s part of the
liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution.‖ Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana,
165 U.S. 578 (1897)).
11. Fisk, supra note 6, at 1132-33.
12. Id. at 1139.
13. Id. at 1185-97. ―The hostility toward contracts assigning employees‘ future patents
was articulated most pointedly in Aspinwell Mfg. Co. v. Gill, an early influence federal
circuit case involving an inventor who assigned his patent to a manufacturing firm and then
went to work for the firm making the product.‖ Id. at 1186 (discussing Aspinwell Mfg. Co.
v. Gill, 32 F. 697 (Cir. Ct. Dist. Ct. N.J. 1887)). However, in cases where it was clear that
the employee agreed to assign his future rights to his employer, courts would then hold such
contracts enforceable. See Littlefield v. Perry, 88. U.S. (21 Wall.) 205 (1874) (holding that
contracts and their provisions assigning future rights to inventions were enforceable).
14. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual Property, in
NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 138 (Stephen R. Munzer
ed., 2001); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 299302 (1988). Locke‘s theory is applicable to intellectual property as it awards an individual
for her labor by automatically granting her the rights to the ―fruits‖ of her efforts and work,
which in intellectual property would be the rights conferred upon the issuance of a patent (or
in certain cases a copyright, trademark, or trade secret).
15. ―Intellectual Property law has been framed around the ancient notion that individual
labor (creativity) deserves a prize, and that the recognition of exclusive property rights
constitutes such a prize.‖ Ugo Mattei & Andrea Pradi, Property Rights: A Comparative
Law and Economics Perspective in the Global Era, in PROPERTY RIGHTS DYNAMICS: A LAW
AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 40, 50 (Donatella Porrini & Giovanni Battista Ramello eds.,
2007).
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First, unless there was a clear contractual provision establishing
ownership of inventions, courts would not interpret any assignment of
rights (to employers) into agreements. Furthermore, even if terms granting
rights were included in a contract, courts narrowly construed the coverage
of the agreement against the employer.16 However, as will be discussed
below, this trend has recently changed—especially after the DDB
Technologies decision and the collaborative efforts inherent in many
radical technological developments.17
Nonetheless, although the theory of the ―individual genius‖ recognizes
the individual work behind an invention, firms are still considered the
―logical repositories‖ of legal rights over intellectual property
developments.18 Firms have been defined as ―institutional vehicles in
which complementary material, intellectual and financial resources are
collected and organised [sic] to manage the risks inherent in innovative
activity.‖19 Internationally the treatment of intellectual property rights
differs and therefore causes inconsistencies,20 especially for firms with a
global presence. As the foundation of many patents has transformed from
work of the ―individual genius‖ to one of ―team work,‖ particularly while
subject to an employment agreement, courts have begun to interpret
assignments with greater deference to the parties to the contract.
Consequently, although it has been maintained that the lack of an express
agreement represents that an employer has no interest in patents issued to
or created by one of its employees,21 this view has shifted and evolved
since the emergence of employment contracts, assignment provisions, and
state courts‘ interpretation thereof.
B.

The Rise of the Corporate Form and Employment Contracts

Although patents were historically deemed representative of
―individual genius,‖ such innovations are today considered products of a
―collective enterprise‖ of creations and ideas.22 This transformation
16. Fisk, supra note 6, at 1187–88. See also Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Hansen, 137 F.
403, 410 (3d Cir. 1905) (establishing that an assignment contract must be express and
supported by clear evidence); Hopedale Mach. Co. v. Entwistle, 133 Mass. 443, 444 (1882)
(holding that a contract granting the employer rights to the employee‘s invention developed
while under employment did not apply after the contract expired even though parts of the
innovation had been developed prior to the agreement‘s termination).
17. See infra Part II.B (describing the collective nature of innovative development
prevalent in many companies today).
18. WILLIAM VAN CAENEGEM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND INNOVATION, 94-95
(2007).
19. Id.
20. See id. at 95 (discussing how each nation grants such rights differently).
21. Talbot v. Harrison, 270 N.Y.S. 171 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1933).
22. Fisk, supra note 6, at 1133.
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resulted in changes in corporate structure and led to the predominance of
contracts in determining ownership of patents and inventions.
The rising significance of contracts reflected not only a change in
legal discourse, but also a change in actual practice in the workplace. As
firms grew in size, they began to invest in research and development and as
personnel management became increasingly organized and bureaucratized,
employers began to also be more systematic in their handling of employeeinventors. Employers more frequently required that all employees who
were likely to invent sign agreements assigning their potential inventions to
their employer.23 Furthermore, because patents are ―reward[s] to those who
. . . exert their abilities, employ their time, and spend their money in the
production of something new and useful to the community,‖24 tension
arises when an employer has control over or owns the time, money, and
resources utilized in the creation of such patents.
Employers seek to maximize the benefit of employees‘ ―individual
genius‖ while minimizing the costs associated with such benefits. Costs
include the employee allocating her time, while working, to developing a
patent that may not constitute a direct part of her position‘s
responsibilities.25 Nonetheless, employers often have an advantageous
position in negotiating for ownership and use of their employees‘
inventions because of the greater resources employers make available to
their employees, consultants, and contractors.26 Innovators often lack the
access to such resources when developing patentable ideas while
unemployed.27
As a result, employment contracts are not only significant in
protecting both the employer and employee, but also in encouraging and
23. Id. at 1185.
24. RICHARD GODSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR
INVENTIONS AND OF COPYRIGHT 19 (William Benning ed., 2d ed. 1844).
25. This opportunity cost is often a disadvantage to employers. The employee
developing an independent innovation could be utilizing that same time to develop or work
on projects under her exclusive employment responsibilities. Opportunity costs are
significant when conducting a cost-benefit analysis for such situations because they
―represent the value of a forgone opportunity when some other choice is made.‖ Elchanan
Cohn & Samuel T. Cooper, Multi-Product Cost Functions for Universities: Economies of
Scale and Scope, in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION 579, 588
(Geraint Johnes & Jill Johnes eds., 2004).
26. This presumes that the employee would not have access to such advantages if she
were unemployed or working for a different enterprise. Nonetheless, these stronger
resources frequently consist of, but are not limited to, greater financial resources, networks
and contacts in a particular industry, and equipment to produce and perfect a particular
product or service. In addition, the talent, expertise, and input of co-workers and other
employment-related colleagues are particularly pertinent especially for patents, which are
increasingly becoming products of collaborative efforts. Fisk, supra note 6, at 1192.
27. Id. See also infra Parts III.B and IV (discussing the benefits inventors garner while
employed).

HEDVAT FINALIZED_SEVEN_ UPDATED (DO NOT DELETE)

822

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

5/11/2011 9:32 PM

[Vol. 13:3

supporting the ongoing growth of technological innovation.28 The National
Venture Capital Association (―NVCA‖) conducts an annual study, entitled
Venture Impact: The Economic Importance of Venture Capital-Backed
Companies in the U.S. Economy, which, in 2008, found that venturebacked companies corresponded to 21% of the United States Gross
Domestic Product (―U.S. GDP‖).29 This percentage increased by nearly
25% since 2006 when it was determined that only 17.6% of U.S. GDP was
contributable to such companies.30 Most importantly, the many innovations
developed by venture-backed companies have been and continue to be
―disruptive technologies‖ which lead to groundbreaking patents and
advancements.31 These technologies may build upon prior inventions or
more importantly establish and launch novel and radical ideas that are new
to their respective markets. This is the type of technological growth that is
28. The greater resources provided by a firm are the foundation for the support of
continuing innovation. See contra Michele Boldrin & David Levine, Intellectual Property
and the Efficient Allocation of Social Surplus from Innovations, in PROPERTY RIGHTS
DYNAMICS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE, supra note 15, at 93, 107 (explaining that
excluding a few exceptions, ―[intellectual property] is not necessary for efficient
innovation‖). ―The efficient allocation of surplus from innovation can and would be
achieved by properly regulated competitive markets, and such distribution . . . could provide
the correct incentives for the efficient amount of creation to take place in society.‖ Id.
29. NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, VENTURE IMPACT: THE ECONOMIC
IMPORTANCE OF VENTURE CAPITAL-BACKED COMPANIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY, 2 (2009),
http://www.nvca.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=255&Itemid=103
[hereinafter NVCA REPORT].
30. In 2008, the Head of Research at the National Venture Capital Association
explained the process behind the study relating revenues of venture-backed companies to
U.S. GDP. Calculating the percentage involved finding all companies funded by venture
capital between the 1970s and 1990s. Although many of those firms were no longer in
existence, those that survived were evaluated through Dun and Bradstreet databases. The
total revenue of the venture-backed firms analyzed was then summed and compared to U.S.
GDP. Telephone Interview with John Taylor, Head of Research, National Venture Capital
Association (Apr. 8, 2008). Although there is some criticism as to the equitability of a
revenue-to-GDP comparison, such concerns are mitigated by the Solow Growth Model. See
Shannon H. Hedvat, Entrepreneurial Engineers and Scientists: The Drivers Behind the Most
Significant Innovations and Patents (May 9, 2008) (unpublished M.S.E. thesis, University of
Pennsylvania) (on file with author) (describing the Solow Growth Model‘s theory that
capital, labor, and total product growth rates will be the same in the long run only if
technological progress is non-existent) (citing ROBERT M. SOLOW, GROWTH THEORY: AN
EXPOSITION ix-190 (2d ed. 2000); Press Release, Nobel Prize, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize
in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1987: Robert M. Solow (Oct. 21, 1987)).
31. NVCA REPORT, supra note 29. Disruptive technologies frequently result in what
many scholars consider ―significant patents.‖ The significance of a patent is determined by
various factors including the number of subsequent citations of the given invention in other
patents and applications. ZOLTAN J. ACS AND DAVID AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND SMALL
FIRMS, 51-52 (1991); DAVID AUDRETSCH, INNOVATION AND INDUSTRY EVOLUTION, 31-37
(1995); Manuel Trajtenberg, A Penny for Your Quotes: Patent Citations and the Value of
Innovations, RAND J. ECON., 1990, at 172-87. This measurement is often scaled by the
elapsed time since the publication and issuance of the patent being evaluated.
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sought by venture capitalists and innovation experts.
Therefore, many significant inventions are being developed at and
supported by both start-up and long established firms. The ownership and
protection of patents granted as a result of these innovations are important
for employees, employers, and (potential) investors. Although in the late
1890s courts‘ reasoning for enforcing assignment provisions was based on
the theory that ―employment provided opportunities for invention,‖32
decisions today focus more on the ―collective nature of research and
development.‖33
Research and development hiring has resulted in the categorization of
patents into three areas: firm-owned, firm-related, and independent.34
These groups may be incorporated into employment contract provisions by
utilizing them in defining specific patent rights, assignments, and
distinctions.35 As a result, the invention development process and the
benefits garnered by both employers and employees with respect to
innovations are vital when considering the effects of language used when
forming employment contracts.36

32. See Fisk, supra note 6, at 1192 (discussing the 1890s courts‘ enforcement of an
assignment agreement in Hulse v. Bonsack Machine Co., 65 F. 864 (4th Cir. 1895)).
33. Id.
34. Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.
LAW & TEC. 1, 7 (1999). Merges defines each category as shown in the adapted table
below:
Type

Invention Status

Ownership

Firm-Owned

Inventor ―employed to
invent‖

Firm owns outright

Firm-Related

Non-R&D inventor;
invention related to
employee duties or created
with employer resources

Split entitlement: employee
owns patent, but firm has
―shop right,‖ a limited,
nontransferable license

Independent

Invention unrelated to
employee duties or created
without employer resources

Employee owns outright

35. The categories are also important when evaluating the ―significance‖ of a patent.
ACS & AUDRETSCH, supra note 31; AUDRETSCH, supra note 31; Hedvat, supra note 30.
36. The language used in employment contracts may improve the difficulties in
assignment provisions if the type(s) of patents covered by the agreement are defined. See
supra note 34 for a list and table of these patent categorizations.
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III. DDB TECHNOLOGIES LLC V. MLB ADVANCED MEDIA, LP: A NEW AGE
OF EMPLOYER RIGHTS
Employment contracts and the interpretation thereof have traditionally
been subject to state law. However, ―the question of whether a patent
assignment clause creates an automatic assignment or merely an obligation
to assign is intimately bound up with the question of standing in patent
cases . . . [and is therefore] treated . . . as a matter of federal law.‖37 This
recent holding in DDB Technologies ―seemingly enhances the rights of
employers,‖38 demonstrating a change in the trend of courts‘ protection of
employers and employees.39
A.

Background of DDB Technologies

David Barstow, a former employee of Schlumberger Technology
Corporation (―Schlumberger‖), founded DDB Technologies, LLC (―DDB‖)
with his brother (not an employee of Schlumberger).40 While working for
Schlumberger, Barstow and his brother developed a computer simulation
program that ultimately resulted in the issuance of four patents.41 Although
several employees confirmed that Schlumberger, or at least some of its
employees, was aware of the program‘s development,42 the company never
claimed ownership or rights to the product, especially since the firm was in
an unrelated industry of oil wells.43 Nonetheless, Barstow left the firm in
1994 to launch his new venture, DDB.
In 2004, DDB filed a patent infringement suit against MLB Advanced
Media (―MLB‖).44 At this point, from 1994 until 2005, Schlumberger did
not assert any ownership interests in or rights to the patents granted for

37. DDB Technologies, LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP, 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
38. Baniak & Dawson, supra note 4, at 298.
39. See supra Part II.A for the history of courts‘ treatment of employers and employees
in contract disputes.
40. DDB Technologies, 517 F.3d at 1286.
41. The developed program resulted in three ―Computer Simulation Patents‖ (U.S.
Patent Nos. 5,526,479, 5,671,347, and 6,204,862) and one ―Pattern-Matching Patent‖ (U.S.
Patent No. 5,189,630). Id. The former patents encompass ―a method for generating a
computer simulation of a live event for display on a viewer‘s computer‖ while the latter
relates to ―a method allowing a viewer to search for certain information about a live event.‖
Id. All four patents were ultimately assigned to Barstow and his brother in 1998, six years
before the infringement suit was filed.
42. Id. at 1287.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1288. The suit alleged that MLB ―provide[d] several Internet services related
to baseball that infringe[d] the Computer Simulation Patents and the Pattern-Matching
Patent.‖ Id. See also supra note 41 for a list of the patents at issue.
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Barstow‘s computer simulation program.45
Despite this inactivity,
Schlumberger decided, a year after the suit was initiated, to enter into an
agreement with MLB transferring ―all of Schlumberger‘s rights and interest
in the patents in suit and granted MLB[] a retroactive license to practice
under those patents.‖46 This agreement allowed MLB to seek dismissal of
DDB‘s action against MLB for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.47
Although the district court granted MLB‘s motion to dismiss,48 the appeal
by DDB provided the Federal Circuit with the opportunity to review the
case.49
The language of Barstow‘s employment contract50 granted
Schlumberger the rights and ownership of patents that were developed
under the agreement and were ―suggested by‖ or ―relate[d] . . . to‖
Barstow‘s work for the company.51 While the Federal Circuit admitted that
the agreement language was ambiguous, it nonetheless held that the effect
of the language was to automatically assign ownership of inventions to
Schlumberger.52
This decision not only raises concerns because
45. DDB Technologies, 517 F.3d at 1293.
46. Id. at 1288.
47. MLB‘s motion was ―based on DDB‘s failure to join all owners of the patents in suit
(including MLB[]) and on DDB‘s inability to pursue an infringement claim against MLB[]
by virtue of its newly acquired ownership interest in those patents.‖ Id.
48. Id.
49. The ultimate question before the court was ―whether the interest of Dr. David
Barstow . . . in these patents was previously assigned to his former employer, Schlumberger
. . . .‖ Id. at 1286.
50. The provisions in the employment agreement between Barstow and Schlumberger
regarding ownership of employee inventions included:
3. Employee shall promptly furnish to Company a complete record of any and
all technological ideas, inventions and improvements, whether patentable or not,
which he, solely or jointly, may conceive, make or first disclose during the
period
of
his
employment
with
[Schlumberger].
4. Employee agrees to and does hereby grant and assign to Company or its
nominee his entire right, title and interest in and to ideas, inventions and
improvements coming within the scope of Paragraph 3:
a) which relate in any way to the business or activities of [Schlumberger],
or
b) which are suggested by or result from any task or work of Employee
for
[Schlumberger],
or
c) which relate in any way to the business or activities of Affiliates of
[Schlumberger],
together with any and all domestic and foreign patent rights in such ideas,
inventions and improvements. Employee agrees to execute specific assignments
and do anything else properly requested by [Schlumberger], at any time during
or after employment with [Schlumberger], to secure such rights.
Id. at 1287.
51. Id. at 1290.
52. Id. The court further clarified that as a result of this holding, DDB‘s defenses based
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Schlumberger failed to object to Barstow‘s full ownership and use of the
patents for over a decade,53 but also because it demonstrates the federal
courts‘ move toward a pro-employer approach for patent assignments.
B.

Effects of DDB Technologies on Employment Relationships

The difficulties that arise from the DDB Technologies holding are
magnified by the language chosen by employers when drafting
employment agreements. Although federal law governs the interpretation
of patent assignment provisions (according to the Federal Circuit in DDB
Technologies), and therefore creates uniformity, general contract
interpretation is still under state law jurisdiction. Judge Pauline Newman,
in her dissenting opinion in DDB Technologies, emphasized that contracts
are ―creatures of state law . . . [and] they should be governed by whatever
contractual law was binding on the parties at the time.‖54 The separation
created by the majority in DDB Technologies undermines the benefits often
sought by companies when selecting a particular state for incorporation or
an applicable law provision in contracts. Nonetheless, employers and
employees must now carefully consider the terms comprising a patent
assignment clause, if any.
Corporations and firms maintain that the DDB Technologies decision
only highlights the advantages of ―put[ting] [the inventions and patents] in
[employers‘] hands‖ because the employee, on her own, ―can‘t handle it.‖55
However, this conclusion assumes that the employees creating such
inventions would not have been able to launch their own ventures or have
access to the resources needed to succeed in the development of a new
(patentable) innovation if they were unemployed. Nonetheless, it is
possible for an employee to unexpectedly develop a new idea while
employed,56 even if the project is unrelated to her official responsibilities.
on estoppel, waiver, and statute of limitations were without merit. Id.
53. Baniak & Dawson, supra note 4, at 306.
54. Id. at 308. See also DDB Technologies, 517 F.3d at 1294 (Newman, J., dissenting)
(―Interpretation of employment contracts, including clauses establishing employer-employee
obligations with respect to inventions and patents, is a traditional state matter. This is a
quite different issue from ‗standing in patent cases . . . .‘‖).
55. Baniak & Dawson, supra note 4, at 309.
56. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical
Assessment of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1225 n.244 (1984) (―[C]onglomerate firms obtain economies of scale when conducting
basic research, because technological innovation resulting from such research is often
unpredictable, and hence the diversified firm with more product lines stands a greater
chance of benefiting from an unexpected innovation.‖ (citing Nelson, The Simple
Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. 297, 302 (1959))). See also Harry
McCraken, The Patents of Steve Jobs: Ten Unexpected Inventions that add up to a Portrait
of Apple’s CEO, TECHNOLOGIZER, May 28, 2009, http://technologizer.com/2009/05/28/the-
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This does not suggest, however, that the individual would have been unable
to successfully create the invention if she were not employed, even if the
concept precipitated from her work.57
Consequently, it is imperative for employees, more than employers in
many situations, to carefully analyze the language used in labor
agreements. The DDB Technologies decision stands for the proposition
that an employer is entitled to the work an employee has accomplished on
the employer‘s time and through the use of the employer‘s laboratories and
equipment. This right is realized even if the employee was not hired to
invent and the ultimate innovation does not relate to the firm‘s business.58
The holding grants employers even more leverage in negotiating contracts
than they previous had.
Before DDB Technologies, employers were viewed as having a
significant bargaining advantage when hiring employees and drafting
related agreements.59 Now, however, not only are employers granted
authority over patents when express language is provided in an
employment contract,60 but they are also entitled to bring suit to obtain
ownership rights of former employees‘ patents that they did not
demonstrate interest in or control over for several years (as in DDB
Technologies).61 This effect also impacts the effective termination of such
contracts, as demonstrated by Barstow‘s situation.
Furthermore, drafters of employment contracts must also be cautious
in structuring the terms of automatic assignments so there is no ambiguity.
For example, defining ownership only for those inventions ―related to‖ the
industry in which the firm operates or the responsibilities for which the
employee was hired leaves great room for dispute, as shown in DDB

patents-of-steve-jobs/ (describing ―unexpected‖ patents developed by Steve Jobs that have
been vital to the recent successes of Apple).
57. This is particularly pertinent as capital and investment opportunities for inventions
are more accessible and varied than before. Steve Lohr, Turning Patents into ‘Invention
Capital,‘ N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2010, at B1. Therefore, investments can be sought by
individual entrepreneurs and innovators, which may ultimately diminish the reliance of
these individuals on employer firms for such advantages.
58. Baniak & Dawson, supra note 4, at 301.
59. PATRICK J. CIHON & JAMES OTTAVIO CASTAGNERA, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
(6th ed. 2008); RICHARD EDWARDS, RIGHTS AT WORK: EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE
POST-UNION ERA 51 (1993) (discussing how the ―asymmetry in the bargaining powers of an
employer and the individual worker‖ was one of the key factors in the legalization of labor
unions).
60. An example of express language is: ―Agrees to and does hereby grant and assign.‖
―Hereby assign[ing]‖ such invention and patent rights creates an automatic legal assumption
of ownership. Baniak & Dawson, supra note 4, at 308.
61. The time delay Schlumberger was permitted before demonstrating its ownership in
DDB Technologies was, however, influenced in part by the state law under which Barstow‘s
employment contract was formed. DDB Technologies, 517 F.3d at 1290.
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Technologies.62 Companies are advised by legal counsel to ―ensure that
patent assignment provisions effect a current and express assignment of
present and future inventions in their employment agreements in light of
the decision in DDB Technologies.‖63 More significantly, subsequent
courts have adopted the reasoning and holding of the Federal Circuit in
DDB Technologies,64 indicating that potential innovators will now be faced
with more difficult decisions in obtaining employment. Although the risks
and uncertainty in developing innovations are less when working for a
larger firm,65 the protection of one‘s ―individual genius,‖ that was prevalent
and supported by the legal system for many years66 is lost when
assignments are construed to be automatic.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF PATENTS AND INNOVATIONS TO EMPLOYERS
AND EMPLOYEES
The reasoning behind employees‘ decisions to maintain jobs at firms
with significant research and development divisions is often questionable
because of the control that employees may lose over their ideas and
62. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing the employment contract at
issue in DDB Technologies); infra note 104 (examining similar disputes that arise under
copyright law, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (1976)). In addition, in academia settings, it has
been argued that after DDB Technologies ―draftspersons of university intellectual property
policies charged with creating an automatic assignment would be well-served to include
express language to the effect that the assignment is automatic.‖ Anthony J. Luppino,
Fixing a Hole: Eliminating Ownership Uncertainties to Facilitate University-Generated
Innovation, 78 UMKC L. REV. 367, 392-93 (2009).
63. Robert N. Holtzman et al., Employment Law and Intellectual Property Alert:
Federal Circuit Supplants State Law to Interpret Patent Assignments in Employment
Agreements,
KRAMER
LEVIN
(Nov.
2008),
http://www.kramerlevin.com/files/Publication/6f9ad442-24de-4da7-978f01cb5697ac73/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2b14750e-6f78-401e-8303056221f91727/Employment%20Law_IP%20Alert.pdf.
64. See Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys.,
Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 840-41 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (reaffirming the holding in DDB Technologies
with respect to statutes of limitations and automatic assignments); Rothschild v. Cree, Inc.,
711 F. Supp. 2d 173, 182 (D. Mass. 2010) (―There is a distinction between an agreement
that automatically assigns the patent as soon as the invention comes into being, and an
agreement that merely creates an obligation to assign the patent in the future.‖); EMD Crop
Bioscience, Inc. v. Becker Underwood, Inc., No. 10-cv-283, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116626,
at *13 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2010) (explaining that the Federal Circuit ―applies federal law to
determine the validity and terms of an assignment for patent rights‖); STMicroelectronics,
Inc. v. Harari, No. 05- 04691, 2008 BL 192449 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2008) (applying the
DDB Technologies standard that automatic assignments of patents is governed by federal
law).
65. Merges, supra note 34, at 30. Risks and uncertainty are considered less when
employed by a larger firm because of the increased access to financial and technological
resources.
66. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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innovations. Employees are likely to be disadvantaged in the protection
and ultimate ownership of their inventions when working for larger
corporations. However, obtaining such employment reduces the high
degree of uncertainty and risk associated with research and development.67
While ―[i]t is clear . . . that an inventor may use the services, ideas, and aid
of others in the process of perfecting his invention without losing his right
to a patent,‖68 there is still a question of who obtains the rights when the
patent is granted, especially when the inputs into the development of the
idea belong to a company.69
A.

Employees’ Incentives at Larger Firms

Innovators who seek to establish disruptive technologies70 are faced
with two general options: to work for a large firm with significant research
and development resources or to launch an entrepreneurial start-up
venture.71 The latter choice has greater risk but offers higher returns and
grants an inventor more control over the process.72 When an employee is
strictly hired to invent, it is reasonable for the employer to expect to obtain
full ownership and rights to any innovations and patents established under
employment-related projects and obligations.73 However, when the
invention is not directly related to the employee‘s responsibilities or the
nature of the company‘s business, it is questionable whether the firm
should acquire all the benefits. Consequently, the specific language used in
an employment contract is vital in resolving such disputes.74
67. Merges, supra note 34, at 30. Such uncertainties include the risks an innovator
undertakes when investing various resources into new and not yet developed ideas.
68. Hobbs v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm‘n, 451 F.2d 849, 864 (5th Cir. 1971)
(emphasis added).
69. These inputs include, but are not limited to, labor, financial resources, and technical
and lab equipment. A company‘s type of business and its divisions greatly affect the
resources available to its employees and the extent to which collaboration (or co-authorship
for copyrights) is possible.
70. See supra note 31 and Part II.B (discussing disruptive technologies).
71. Merges, supra note 34, at 31.
72. Entrepreneurs are frequently also the engineers and inventors behind the technology
or product prompting the start of a new company. Hedvat, supra note 30. Such firms are
often smaller because ―in industries that are highly innovative and comprise predominantly
of large firms, the relative innovative advantage [is] found to be held by small enterprises.‖
AUDRETSCH, supra note 31, at 38.
73. If employees were permitted to allocate all the risk of innovation to a firm but then
reap the benefits (of ownership and patent rights) if and when the invention succeeds, then
―employees would claim ownership of valuable inventions, leaving the firm with worthless
ones, and corporate [research and development] would grind to a halt.‖ Merges, supra note
34, at 31. A balance is necessary when evaluating the costs and benefits of owning
employee innovations and patents.
74. See supra Part III (discussing the effects of assignment language in employment
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In addition, courts have opposed the argument that innovation and
trade will be stifled if employers continue to obtain rights to all future
inventions of employees.75 The basis for this reasoning is founded in the
belief that if inventors are unable to utilize the resources and opportunities
given while employed at a large and successful corporation, then the public
will not benefit from such inventors‘ potential.76 If the employee does not
have the resources to pursue her ideas before obtaining employment, then
when she is employed she is arguably afforded access to greater assets for
the invention process while also being compensated through her salary. 77
Nonetheless, when drafting employment contracts it is unlikely that
employers consider the public‘s and the inventor‘s best interests, especially
in light of the incentives companies have in obtaining control of patent and
invention rights from their employees.78
B.

Employee Patents and the Effect on Competition and Antitrust
Policies

In a study analyzing the value of 222 patents in the United States,
participant companies reported that almost 10% of their patents were worth
over $100 million.79 Furthermore, 50.2% were valued above $1 million.80
Companies in these particular sectors, such as high-technology firms and
venture-backed technology start-ups,81 have a significant economic and
contracts).
75. Hulse v. Bonsack Mach. Co., 65 F. 864, 868-69 (4th Cir. 1895); Merges, supra note
34, at 31. This view is supported by a more recent argument that intellectual property is not
essential in encouraging innovation. Boldrin & Levin, supra note 28. Therefore, if
intellectual property rights are the main assignments issued to employers (through
employment contracts), then this reasoning is significant. Moreover, the more substantial
resources provided by and available at a firm are the foundation for the support of
continuing innovation. Id.
76. See Hulse, 65 F. at 868 (holding that an employment contract was not against public
policy as it allowed the inventor to benefit from the corporation‘s resources); Merges, supra
note 34, at 31 (stating that a reason why inventors seek employment in research and
development units of firms is to benefit from investments of the firms that are key to the
invention).
77. An employee‘s salary is a benefit, on some levels, because if one were to launch her
own venture, it is likely that she would be dependent upon investors and debt while lacking
an independent source of income. Nonetheless, the risks associated with not having a steady
salary (i.e., starting a new business) often reap greater results that do benefit the public (i.e.,
radical technological advancements and innovations).
78. Bigger firms, with higher employment, may benefit most because of the increased
probability of invention development across the larger number of employees. Coffee, Jr.,
supra note 56, at 1225.
79. F.M. SCHERER, PATENTS: ECONOMICS, POLICY AND MEASUREMENT, 269 (2005).
80. Id.
81. Another sector where patent rights, particularly in software, have had an increasing
importance is the financial industry. Robert P. Merges, The Uninvited Guest: Patents on
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competitive motivation in seeking the automatic assignment of employees‘
inventions, particularly given the high value of radical patents.82 Many
firms may find it more efficient to control inventions that correspond to
their commercial and technological profile because they can assemble the
complementary skills and resources necessary to maximize innovations‘
uses.83 Consequently, the DDB Technologies holding, by appearing to
favor employers,84 only furthers their competitive advantages in not only
negotiating employment contracts but also in gaining market power.
Competition and antitrust policies are also directly related to
intellectual property rights.85 For example, the Global Competitiveness
Report, produced annually by the World Economic Forum, ranked the
United States, for 2009-2010, in the top ten of 133 countries for capacity
for innovation, company spending research and development, and
availability of scientists and engineers, among other areas.86 Furthermore,
Wall Street, in PROPERTY RIGHTS DYNAMICS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 15, at 116, 117-19.
82. Radical patents and innovations are similar to disruptive technologies. See supra
note 31. Radical inventions are often compared to incremental innovations. The ―disruptive
quality‖ and characteristics of radical innovations include being ―outside the predicted
pattern.‖ What is Accelerated Radical Innovation?, INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP ON
ACCELERATED
RADICAL
INNOVATION,
1
(Mar.
2005),
http://wwwiwari2005.eng.utoledo.edu/pages/pdfs/WhatIsAcceleratedRadicalInnovation.pdf
(citing
JOHN A. BERS & JOHN P. DISMUNKES, ROADMAP FOR A RADICAL INNOVATION COMMUNITY OF
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE (2004) (unpublished manuscript)). ―Unlike most incremental
innovation, which is based either on well-developed science or existing technology, radical
innovation makes a dramatic impact on innovation performance by explicitly linking
directly into the concurrently expanding scientific frontiers of pure and user-inspired basic
research . . . .‖ Id. at 2.
83. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 18, at 95.
84. See Stephen G. Charkoudian et al., Patents, Employment Contracts and Automatic
Assignment: Federal Law Holds Sway, IP ADVISOR (Goodwin Proctor, Boston, Mass.) Apr.
2008,
http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publications/Attorney-Articles/2008/AutomaticAssignment-IP-Advisor-April-2008.aspx (stating that if assignment-of-invention clauses are
drafted properly, employers can seek comfort in the fact that they will automatically own
employees‘ inventions at the time of creation); Holtzman et al., supra note 63 (stating that
employers can be reasonably certain assignment-of-invention clauses will be uniformly
interpreted under federal law to automatically assign ownership of employees‘ inventions to
employers regardless of contrary state law). See also Lisa Treannie & Howard Zaharoff,
DDB Technologies: Beware the IP Assignment Clause, IP NEWS (Morse Barnes-Brown
Pendleton
PC,
Waltham,
Mass.),
Jan.
2009,
http://www.mbbp.com/resources/iptech/newsletters/pdfs/IPNews-IPAssignmentClause.pdf;
Darin Snyder, Employment Agreements and Assignment of Patents by Employees,
O‘MELVENY
&
MYERS
LLP
(Mar.
21
2008),
http://www.omm.com/newsroom/publication.aspx?pub=607.
85. Mattias Ganslandt, Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy, in
FRONTIERS OF ECONOMICS AND GLOBALIZATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GROWTH AND
TRADE 233 (Keith E. Maskus ed., 2008).
86. WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2009-2010, 15 (Klaus
Schwab ed., 2009) [hereinafter WORLD. ECON. FORUM 2009-2010], available at
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in 2006-2007, the correlation between the index for antitrust effectiveness87
and the index of intellectual property protection88 was 0.90 in the United
States.89 These indices and rankings, particularly in the United States,
further emphasize the strong relationship between a firm‘s position and
market control in its business sector and its intellectual property rights,
protection, and developments.
Therefore, companies are incentivized to seek acquisition of their
employees‘ inventions that will or have already resulted in patent
protection. While supply of the labor to produce such intellectual property
is high,90 demand is also at its peak as the advantages of acquiring such
employees provide economic, financial, and competitive benefits for a
company, in its respective market(s). Although a higher supply may yield
greater negotiating power for the employers when seeking innovators,
employers are not benefited by contractual terms below those automatically
assigning all patent and invention rights to the company. These provisions,
however, are not favored by the sought-after employees.
Nonetheless, while innovation enhances the efficiency and growth of a
particular firm in its respective market,91 the incentive to innovate may be
stifled if the firm is unable to acquire the necessary talent.92 Employees
may not accept particular employment if a similar situation to that in DDB
Technologies arises or may arise.93 Furthermore, if an employee needs an
https://members.weforum.org/pdf/GCR09/GCR20092010fullreport.pdf.
87. While there is variation in how ―antitrust effectiveness‖ may be defined, elements
considered in the analysis and computation of the figure include a region‘s local competition
level, commitment to corruption, and effective decision-making and regulation of antitrust
policy. D. Daniel Sokol, The Future of International Antitrust and Improving Antitrust
Agency Capacity, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 1081 n.4 (2009).
88. The International Intellectual Property Rights Index (―IPRI‖) captures countries‘
―strength and effectiveness [in] their property rights protection . . . [as] a useful tool for
policymakers, academics, business leaders, think tanks, and other researchers.‖
ALEXANDRA C. HORST, INTERNATIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS INDEX (IPRI): 2007 REPORT 1
(2007),
http://www.internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/UserFiles/File/PRA_Interior_LowRes.pdf.
89. Ganslandt, supra note 85, at 235 (citing WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL
COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2006-2007 (2006)).
90. WORLD ECON. FORUM 2009-2010, supra note 86, at 14.
91. Ganslandt, supra note 85, at 234.
92. Although courts previously rejected the proposition that employers‘ ownership of
employees‘ patents would stifle innovation, Hulse v. Bonsack Mach. Co., 65 F. 864 (4th
Cir. 1895); Merges, supra note 34, at 31, the position is stronger now after the decision in
DDB Technologies granting employers even greater control and authority over inventions of
their employees.
93. In particular, the ability of a firm to claim ownership of a (former) employee‘s
patent(s), after not demonstrating any intent or authority over such innovations for more
than ten years, raises concerns for potential employees. Furthermore, although the time
allowed in DDB Technologies was partially dependent upon the state law under which the
agreement was made, the effects of the decision are undoubtedly beneficial for employers
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income and therefore opts to obtain a position at a larger firm, she may be
reluctant to further the development of an idea or innovation.94 The
inclination to stall the growth of her invention may be grounded in the fact
that her employer, potentially in an unrelated industry to her idea, may be
the automatic owner of any future patents and inventions. In addition,
employers are now instructed by legal counsel95 to be more diligent in
making certain that assignment provisions are carefully drafted to
encompass the maximum coverage possible.96 Employees, however, do not
always have equal access to legal advice and support.
V.

HOW EMPLOYERS‘ ACTIONS AND DECISIONS MAY CHANGE

Employers, among other groups, are affected by the DDB
Technologies decision on different levels.97 However, the effects and
changes that will be witnessed over the next several years are uncertain as
this case was one of ―first impression.‖98 The Federal Circuit explained
that even if a contract asserts that it is established under a particular state‘s
law, provisions regarding patent assignments will nonetheless be regulated
under federal law.99 Consequently, decisions to incorporate under or to
enter into contracts subject to a specific state‘s law and jurisdiction are no
longer as controlling and significant, at least when seeking a legal system
favoring employers‘ rights to employees‘ inventions.100
This also
influences consultant and contractor agreements that cover various
territories and extend over state lines. Therefore, such agreements may be
subject to differing legal authorities.101
Uniformity, however, has
especially since federal law has been deemed to control such provisions‘ interpretation. Bd.
of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d
832, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2009); DDB Technologies, LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP, 517 F.3d
1284, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
94. Her opportunity cost of giving up the development of her invention for employment
(and an income) may be low enough to justify her not spending ―work‖ time to further
develop a personal innovation. For a discussion on opportunity costs, see supra note 25.
95. For examples of law firms‘ memorandums and news releases on DDB Technologies
and its effects on employers (and employees), see supra note 84.
96. Treannie & Zaharoff, supra note 84.
97. For a further discussion, see supra Parts III and IV.
98. Baniak & Dawson, supra note 4, at 307.
99. DDB Technologies, LLC v. MLB Advanced Media, LP, 517 F.3d 1284, 1290 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).
100. See contra id. at 1294 (Newman, J., dissenting) (explaining that contract
interpretations and disputes are matters left to state law). See also Baniak & Dawson, supra
note 4, at 308 (stating that the decision to grant federal jurisdiction over patent assignment
clauses is justified particularly because patents are ―federal concepts‖ and some employees
are located in ―nonemployer-based‖ states).
101. See Samuel W. Apicelli & Jane Leslie Dalton, Duane Morris LLP, When ‘Will’
Won’t Do In Employment Agreements, LAW 360 (Portfolio Media, Inc., New York, N.Y.),

HEDVAT FINALIZED_SEVEN_ UPDATED (DO NOT DELETE)

834

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

5/11/2011 9:32 PM

[Vol. 13:3

advantages as employers and employees can more easily anticipate the
potential consequences of including or excluding certain language.102
Although patents are governed by federal law, other areas of
intellectual property may not be subject to the same treatment. Therefore,
the effects of the DDB Technologies decision may be limited to patents
and, as a result, only to certain industries.103 The strength of the uniformity
argument for the decision consequently is diminished; while consistency
may be imparted in patent assignment disputes, it is not the case for
disagreements over the assignments of all intellectual property developed
under employment.104
In addition, disputes often arise over intellectual property ownership
in academic and university settings. ―Transition to a more patent-sensitive
environment has particular implications for the academic sector, [in
addition to] industrial sectors that traditionally rely on free and open
exchange . . . .‖105 Some universities are ―fighting for talent‖ while
becoming more liberal because they are trying to bring in (graduate)
students and professors who will succeed in inventing products or ideas
and/or even launching start-ups,106 a potential effect that may occur in the
corporate setting if the need for inventive labor is high and the demand is
even greater. Nonetheless, professors and graduate students, in certain
Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/apicellidalton_law360_0908.pdf
(explaining that uniformity of federal interpretation is beneficial for companies with
employees in multiple states).
102. Boilerplate contracts, for example, help parties to an agreement anticipate potential
provisions and terms. In particular, boilerplates have been found to be ―a trade-off between
communicating intensively in a narrow sphere or communicating in a more stripped-down
formal way in a wider variety of contexts.‖ Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts:
Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1175-76 (2006).
103. The industries significantly impacted by the DDB Technologies decision may not be
limited to those industries dependent upon patented inventions (such as high-technology and
pharmaceutical companies). However, it is more likely to be of higher significance to
employers seeking innovative development (that may result in patents) from their
employees than to employers participating in other types of business sectors. Nonetheless,
from an efficiency and cost-benefit perspective, employers would prefer employee time be
dedicated to company-related projects rather than individually-driven developments,
particularly with unknown ownership of certain future innovations.
104. In copyright law, employment related disputes that often arise are under the ―work
made for hire‖ provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201(b) (1976).
The statute(s) requires an inquiry into the employment relationship and the scope of the
employment at issue. See e.g., Avtec Sys. v. Pfeiffer, 67 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding
that the employee‘s software program developed at home was not a work made for hire
because it was unrelated to assignments under his employment); Cramer v. Crestar Fin.
Corp., 67 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasizing that the computer program Cramer
developed was the type of work he was hired to perform even though it was created at home
and on his own initiative).
105. VAN CAENEGEM, supra note 18, at 96.
106. Baniak & Dawson, supra note 4, at 313.
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programs, are in similar situations when evaluating where to attend and
how the products of their ―intellectual genius‖ will be protected or
owned.107
Finally, investors‘ decisions to financially support different
companies, particularly new ventures, may be affected by the DDB
Technologies decision. Although many start-up companies are founded by
the entrepreneurial engineer behind a groundbreaking idea,108 often times
companies acquire a variety of talent in order to see that they succeed.109
Consequently, employment contracts in these situations must be carefully
drafted to ensure that the start-up will obtain all rights and ownership upon
the patenting of employee-driven inventions. The guarantee of innovation
ownership will be of high importance to potential angel investors and
venture capitalists.110 ―In the technology industries that venture capitalists
target, sustainable competitive advantages normally derive from
intellectual property and innovative ability. Unless a venture firm sees the
potential for patents or some other form of protected intellectual property,
it is unlikely to invest.‖111 Therefore, new companies seeking investment
will have to balance between demonstrating their ability to obtain the
necessary talent112 to achieve their goals while also establishing and
enforcing employment provisions assigning patent ownership and rights to
the firm.

107. Although beyond the scope of this study, please refer to the following for an
analysis of patent and invention ownership in the academic setting: Sunil R. Kulkarni, All
Professors Create Equally: Why Faculty Should Have Complete Control over the
Intellectual Property Rights in their Creations, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 221 (1995); Sandip H.
Patel, Graduate Students’ Ownership and Attribution Rights in Intellectual Property, 71
IND. L.J. 481 (1996).
108. See supra note 72 for a discussion on ―entrepreneurial engineers.‖
109. See JIM COLLINS, GOOD TO GREAT: WHY SOME COMPANIES MAKE THE LEAP . . . AND
OTHERS DON‘T, 41-65, 216-17 (2001) (noting the significance of acquiring the right
―people‖ in order for a company to succeed, especially as a start-up venture).
110. Venture capitalists evaluate various aspects of a company when considering
investment. Six key principles have been used by venture firms when determining the
(potential) success of a (start-up) company: full-time mentor, initial business model, CEO
hiring, money spending patterns, want for the product(s), and ―special people.‖ Michael J.
Roberts & Nicole Tempest, ONSET Ventures, HARV. BUS. REV. 1, 2-3 (Mar. 1998).
According to executives at ONSET Ventures, a venture capital firm that focuses on ―seedstage start-ups,‖ ―special people‖ are vital aspects of a business‘ ultimate success. Id.
111. PAUL A. GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, MONEY OF INVENTION: HOW VENTURE CAPITAL
CREATES NEW WEALTH 78 (2001).
112. See COLLINS, supra note 109, at 41-65 (discussing methods through which new
companies may acquire the ―right people‖ and talent to launch a successful venture).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The DDB Technologies decision has and will continue to change and
affect the way in which employment contracts are formed and interpreted.
In addition, corporate decisions and activities will also be modified in
response to DDB Technologies, particularly in industries interdependent
upon innovation and its legal protection and ownership. Although the
ultimate effects of the case are uncertain and will become more apparent as
courts begin to address similar issues as that in DDB Technologies, it is
clear that debates and disputes will nonetheless occur because employer
and employee goals and objectives often differ with respect to employees‘
individual inventions.
Notwithstanding the uncertainty of DDB
Technologies‘s future effects, employers will seek to utilize language in
employment contracts that establish a per se automatic assignment of
patent rights and ownership. Consequently, potential employees may stifle
their ―individual genius‖ innovation development or refrain from obtaining
employment at particular firms. If the talent needed to develop the groundbreaking, radical, and disruptive technologies is no longer afforded the
benefits of large research and development divisions at various companies,
the consequences on innovation and patents may be chilling.
Nonetheless, the uniformity established by the Federal Circuit in DDB
Technologies creates a new era where contracts are no longer strictly
subject to state law. This may undermine a corporation‘s strategic and
careful choice of regional law governing its contracts and more
significantly the state in which it selects to be incorporated. However,
uniformity in the interpretation of patent assignment provisions creates a
potential inconsistency with similar terms for other forms of intellectual
property, such as copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets, created by
employees. As a result, the ―first impression‖ decision by the Federal
Circuit not only affects the ownership and rights over patentable
developments by employees but more significantly the decisions behind
employment contracts and corporate structure.

